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COMMENTS
The Educational Value Of Direct
Broadcasting Satellites And The
Heightened Need For International
Agreement
Beyond a critical point within finite space freedom diminishes as
numbers increase .... The human question is not how many can
possibly survive within the system, but what kind of existence is pos-
sible for those who do survive.
Frank Herbert, Dune
I. INTRODUCTION
Communications satellites can now provide instantaneous world-
wide transmission of events to television viewers all over the globe.'
One form of communications satellite, the direct broadcasting satel-
lite, affords new unbounded power to broadcast a signal over a large
geographic area for direct television reception by viewers. 2 Many
1. Arthur C. Clarke, perhaps best known for his authorship of the science-fiction epic
2001: A Space Odyssey, is generally credited as the originator of the modem concept of satel-
lite communications. In 1945, Clarke published an article entitled, "Extraterrestrial Relays:
Can Rocket Stations Give Worldwide Radio Coverage?", outlining the fundamental technical
considerations involved in the concept of a communications satellite. Clarke envisioned orbit-
ing space stations which "could be provided with receiving and transmitting equipment and
could act as a repeater to relay transmissions between any two points of the hemisphere be-
neath." D. SMITH, COMMUNICATION VIA SATELLITE: A VISION IN RETROSPECT 17 (1976).
Clarke's calculations showed that three stations placed at an altitude of 23,000 miles would
orbit synchronized with the earth's rotation and would be capable of providing worldwide
communications coverage. Id.
2. UN. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), Report of the
Twenty-Second Session of the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee, The Feasibility of Using
Direct Broadcasting Satellites for Educational Purposes and of Internationally or Regionally
Owned Space Segments, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/341/Rev.1, at 11, para. 33, 29 April 1985
[hereinafter DBS Education]; see also Laskin & Chayes, A Report of the Panel on International
Telecommunication Policy, DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITES: POLICIES AND
PROBLEMS 5 (1985).
Direct broadcasting satellites have even been considered for purposes of continuing legal
education. The American Law Institute (ALl) and the American Bar Association (ABA)
have formed the American Law Network, a project organized to broadcast continuing legal
education programs by satellite to a nationwide audience. ALI-ABA to Beam Legal Education
by Satellite, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 1985, at 7. Broadcasting legal education live by satellite
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countries, particularly developing ones, find direct broadcasting satel-
lite systems a cost-efficient alternative to building conventional
ground redistribution broadcasting systems. 3 Such satellites offer a
country the attractive opportunity to educate previously isolated and
stratified peoples within their borders by using the powerful tool of
mass media.
4
However, the growing use of direct broadcasting satellites for do-
mestic purposes gives rise to a host of legal issues which affect the
international community. For example, what legal rights can the So-
viet Union assert to prevent the United States from freely broadcast-
ing uncensored news of world events or political propaganda to the
Soviet people? 5 Should the Soviet Union be entitled to destroy a satel-
lite used for such a purpose?6 What restrictions should be placed on a
country's right to broadcast to its people when such broadcasts un-
avoidably spill over the borders of a neighboring country?7 Should
there be international restrictions on the program content of broad-
casts?" What equitable rights of access should developing countries
have to the geostationary orbit, a rapidly diminishing natural
resource? 9
enables participant-speaker interaction via toll-free telephone lines or special sound equipment.
Such interaction is viewed by both broadcasters and recipients as a significant advantage over
education by videocassettes. Id.
3. DBS Education, supra note 2, at 9, para. 22. "The main advantages of satellites are
the lower cost of covering very large areas with few or no existing terrestrial transmission and
distribution facilities and the relatively short time required to provide complete coverage of
large areas." Id. at 9, para. 24.
4. Jackhu & Singal, Satellite Technology and Education, 6 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L.
399, 400 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 39-47.
5. Mowlana, Political and Social Implications of Communications Satellite Applications
in Developed and Developing Countries, in ECONOMIC AND POLICY PROBLEMS IN SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS 135 (J. Pelton & M. Snow eds. 1977). See infra text accompanying notes
139-46 regarding the Soviet Union's position on the proposed illegality of transmissions broad-
cast without the express prior consent of the recipient sovereign.
6. See infra text accompanying note 144.
7. See infra note 118. Such a spill-over problem exists with regard to the United States
and Canada. Most of Canada's population resides along the common border with the United
States. Because Canadians can receive an enormous amount of United States television, it is
difficult to maintain a viable Canadian broadcasting system. Warren, A Canadian Perspective
on Direct Broadcast Satellites and the New World Information and Communication Order, 8
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 391 (1981). "Canadian policies are designed to stimulate not to
stifle, that is, to stimulate a variety of programs that Canadians will want to watch and thus
ensure the continued viability of the Canadian broadcasting and communications systems."
Id. at 392.
8. The regulation of program content remains a critical point of contention today. See
infra text accompanying note 153.
9. See infra notes 159-89 and accompanying text.
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Increasingly, the world is becoming smaller as technological ad-
vances bring cultures into closer contact with one another.' 0 The di-
rect broadcasting satellite has been, and continues to be, a key
instrumentality effectuating this shrinkage. Like nuclear reactors,
these satellites are tools with vast power to be used prudently so that
all humanity might benefit. Used carelessly, they hold terrible poten-
tial for provoking fear, hostility and worldwide destruction. I I Be-
cause of these potentially beneficial and detrimental effects, the
international community must deal with these issues carefully and in
a peaceful manner. International law can and should provide the
forum for resolution of direct broadcasting disputes. 12
Although the United Nations has given high priority to establish-
ing regulatory principles for the use of direct broadcasting satellites,
currently no international law provides direct regulation. 13 Neverthe-
less, many countries have implemented, or are in the process of imple-
menting, direct broadcasting satellite systems. 14 In the face of this
increased use, the need for international regulatory principles has only
become more urgent.
This Comment examines legal issues raised by the use of direct
broadcasting satellites, including issues concerning the geostationary
10. See generally Mowlana, supra note 5, at 128-31 (direct broadcasting satellites raise
concerns of cultural intrusion among affected countries). "With the development of a new
awareness, both on the part of the rich (the old colonial powers) and the poor (the old colo-
nies), there began a definite trend towards a really equitable status for all peoples of the
world." Jackhu & Singal, supra note 4, at 399.
11. Technology is not politically neutral. To the contrary, it plays an important political
role in contemporary society involving the distribution of power and the exercise of political,
social, and economic controls. Mowlana, supra note 5, at 124. Control over the distribution of
power is itself power. Obviously, if such control is abused, great harm can result to those
without power. "We, today, have the option to either merely skill train our species and make
it productive for a third spree of madness towards a total self-destruction or to educate it for
survival through mutual respect and a fair exchange." Jackhu & Singal, supra note 4, at 404
(emphasis in original).
12. "States, whether they are space-resource States or not, benefit from the presence of a
rational decision-making process on the part of world actors." Christol, Prospects for an Inter-
national Legal Regime for Direct Television Broadcasting, 34 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 141, 151
(1985).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 88-158. "One problem is that the international
policymaking function in the outer space field is so fragmented that international policies are
not keeping pace with technological developments." Warren, supra note 7, at 393.
14. See generally ECONOMIC AND POLICY PROBLEMS IN SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
app. A (J. Pelton & M. Snow eds. 1977). The countries who have planned or have already
implemented domestic satellite systems include Algeria, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Co-
lombia, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, the Phillipines,
Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, the Soviet Union and Zaire. Id. at 203-18.
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orbit. To assist the nontechnical reader in understanding the
problems raised by direct broadcasting satellites, an initial discussion
of background and technical material is provided. Next, the focus
turns to specific applications of direct broadcasting satellites by India,
Canada and the United States to illustrate the educational value of
such systems. This Comment then provides a survey of the interna-
tional law which presently governs the use of direct broadcasting
satellites and the geostationary orbit. Finally, this Comment proposes
that the member states of the United Nations ratify an international
treaty containing the principles upon which they have been able to
agree.
II. DIRECT BROADCASTING SATELLITES (DBS)
There are two principle types of communications satellites pres-
ently in orbit: passive and active.' 5 The passive satellite operates by
"bouncing" a signal received from a powerful earth station transmit-
ter back to another earth station which picks up the reflected signal. 16
It is essentially a large radio wave mirror. 17 By contrast, the active
satellite does not merely "reflect" a signal back to earth, but also con-
tains electronic equipment to receive and retransmit radio signals sent
from earth. It can therefore amplify the signal to improve its strength
on retransmission to earth.' 8 One major drawback of passive satellites
is that, unlike active satellites, passive satellites require powerful, ex-
pensive ground transmitters and ultra-sensitive ground receivers.19
Upon reaching the ground, the satellite signal is usually referred
to a complex terrestrial redistribution network. 20 If the signal is re-
ceived by a ground station which is itself a rebroadcasting facility that
broadcasts the program signal to individual television sets, it is
deemed "direct distribution."' 2 1 If the receiving ground station must
refer the signal via other ground facilities to a rebroadcasting facility
for rebroadcast to viewers, it is deemed "indirect distribution.
'22
Unlike conventional communications satellites, the direct broad-
15. K. QUEENEY, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 5
(1978).
16. Id..
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 7; see also J. FAWCETr, OUTER SPACE: NEW CHALLENGES TO LAW AND
POLICY 65 (1984).
21. K. QUEENEY, supra note 15, at 7.
22. Id.
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casting satellite (DBS) requires no terrestrial rebroadcasting facility.
Direct satellite broadcasting signifies "the transmission of messages
from the satellite directly to community receivers or to individual
home television sets without the need of local stations to receive and
rebroadcast. ' 23 To receive a DBS signal, an ordinary television set
today need only be supplemented by a special antenna, pre-amplifier
and converter, all of which are modestly priced and commercially
available.
24
Reception of DBS broadcasts can take a variety of forms. The
World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) of 1971 distin-
guished "community reception" from "individual reception.
'25
"Community reception" uses complex ground station receivers for "a
group of the general public at one location or through a distribution
system covering a limited area."'26 The WARC described "individual
reception" as "home reception" using relatively "simple domestic
installations.
27
Satellites are also classified according to the altitude at which
they function. Nonsynchronous satellites are those which orbit at low
or medium altitudes.28 A medium altitude satellite will generally be
placed in an orbit approximately 5,000 to 10,000 miles above the
earth. 29 Because the nonsynchronous satellite's orbit does not coin-
cide with the earth's orbit, the satellite appears to move across the
sky. 30 Every earth terminal, therefore, regardless of whether it is a
transmitting or receiving station, requires two antennas. One is for
communication, and the other tracks the satellite as it follows its orbit
across the sky.3I The primary disadvantage of nonsynchronous satel-
lites is the enormous cost of the complex ground station equipment.
32
By contrast, geosynchronous or high altitude satellites orbit at an
altitude of 22,300 miles above the earth's surface. 33 Placed directly
above the equator, the satellite would orbit the earth every 23 hours
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. J. FAWCETT, supra note 20, at 65.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. K. QUEENEY, supra note 15, at 5.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 5-6.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id.; see also Christol, supra note 12, at 150.
33. K. QUEENEY, supra note 15, at 6. See infra text accompanying notes 109-39 for a
discussion of the legal issues presently raised by the geostationary orbit.
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and 56 minutes, synchronously with the earth's rotation. 34 This orbit,
also termed "geostationary orbit (GSO)," provides "a constant orien-
tation between the satellite and any fixed point on the ground within
view of the satellite, so that there would be no need for ground anten-
nas to move to track the satellite. ' 35 Geostationary satellites have
two principal advantages. First, it takes fewer of them to provide
worldwide coverage. Second, signal reception from a satellite travel-
ing in the GSO does not require a second tracking antenna or its com-
plementary computerized tracking equipment. They are thus less
costly.36
34. U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), Report of the Scien-
tific and Technical Subcommittee to the General Assembly, "The Feasibility of Obtaining
Closer Spacing of Satellites in the Geostationary Orbit.- Study Conducted with the Assistance of
a Group of Experts", U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/340/Rev.1, 22 April 1985, at 11, para. 23
[hereinafter GSO Spacing].
In practice, a satellite cannot remain in a perfectly circular orbit with fixed ori-
entation. Gravitational forces from the Sun and Moon, radiation pressure from the
Sun and variations in the Earth's gravitational field due to departures from perfect
spherical symmetry cause slow, periodic variations in the eccentricity and inclination
of the orbit, resulting in movement of the satellite from its desired geostationary
position .... Active satellites have station-keeping propulsion systems to counteract
the disturbing forces and maintain the satellites close to their desired positions.
Id. at 9, para. 19. It is important to note here, however, that station-keeping propulsion sys-
tems cannot protect a satellite from physical damage upon impact with high-velocity space
debris.
The number of objects in the geostationary orbit, including active satellites, dead
satellites and associated fragments and debris, is increasing steadily, and with it the
probability of collisions between objects. Since these objects may be travelling with
relative speeds up to many kilometres per second, any collision is likely to put an
active satellite completely out of service. Collisions between objects can be divided
into three categories: collisions between two active satellites, collisions of an active
satellite with a dead object and collision between two dead objects.
Id. at 15, para. 43.
The risk of collision between live satellites assigned to the same position can be minimized
by formation-keeping propulsion systems. Id. at para. 45. Potential collisions between live
satellites and dead satellites may be minimized by similar evasive maneuvers by the live satel-
lite. Id. at para. 46. However:
The probability of collision could also increase substantially if the amount of small
untrackable debris in orbits intersecting the geostationary orbit becomes very large,
for example through explosions of propulsion systems or through fragmenting colli-
sions. Since small fragments at high altitude cannot be observed or tracked, it is not
possible to estimate the probability of collision from such objects or to avoid colli-
sions through evasive manoeuvres.
Id. at para. 47.
35. Id. at 9, para. 18.
36. K. QUEENEY, supra note 15, at 6; see Christol, supra note 12, at 151 (the success of
an operating regional DBS system is dependent in part on the availability of positions in the
GSO).
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III. THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF DIRECT
BROADCASTING SATELLITES
A. Recent Studies
Several countries have successfully used DBS to improve the
quality of education and to facilitate access to such improved educa-
tion by large groups of people "to promote economic, social and cul-
tural development. ' 37 In May of 1974, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) launched the first experimental DBS,
the Applications Technology Satellite (ATS-6) and positioned it over
the West Coast of South America in geostationary orbit. 38  NASA
and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare then spon-
sored the Health, Education and Telecommunications Experiment
(HET) during 1974-1975. This project was aimed at providing educa-
tional and health services to small towns in the Rocky Mountains,
Appalachia and Alaska where reception by ground facilities had been
notoriously difficult and costly.3 9
The 118-station HET network broadcast independently-managed
experiments across the target 23 states. 4° HET granted over ten mil-
lion dollars to medical and educational institutions to create the pro-
grams for distribution over the experimental network. 41 Each unique
experiment used variations in programming, audience and equip-
ment.42 The programs were transmitted to ATS-6 from Denver and
broadcast by ATS-6 to receiving "hospitals, schools, learning centers,
37. DBS Education, supra note 2, at 9, para. 20.
In this context, education must be considered to include, in addition to literacy,
numeracy and the traditional academic subjects, skills, knowledge and practice in
such fields as agriculture, public health, hygiene and family planning, and general
knowledge of science, history, the arts and current events. It also includes continu-
ing education for already trained workers, such as doctors and nurses, to keep their
skills and knowledge up to date.
Id.; see also Jackhu & Singal, supra note 4, at 399-400.
Education in this sense is sharing of human experience. It is the possibility of past
knowledge being applied to contemporary problems and the developing of new
means to cope with a different reality. It is an exchange with open mind, rather than
accepting the wisdom of a few: the possibility of each human being becoming a po-
tential source of human knowledge, and the possibility of sharing it for the benefit of
all.
Id. at 400.
38. K. QUEENEY, supra note 15, at 203.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
1987]
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public television stations, remote Alaskan villages and other sites."'43
From August of 1975 through July of 1976, ATS-6 was made
available to India for their Satellite Instructional Television Experi-
ment (SITE)." At the beginning of India's school year, the Indian
Government began using ATS-6 to broadcast educational, agricul-
tural, family planning, national integration and cultural programming
to approximately 5,000 agrarian villages. 45 Approximately 2,400 of
these villages used direct reception sets: television sets with convert-
ers and small 10-foot antennas made of chicken wire. Other villages
were served after the signal was received first by a ground terminal
and rebroadcast to them.46 ATS-6 was capable of transmitting one
picture and two sound channels, enabling the Indians to combine two
distinct language areas which had common agro-socio-economic con-
ditions for programs.47
The Indian Ministry of Education decided to introduce television
into the primary level of education in an effort to use the novelty of
the medium to combat the high drop-out rate by motivating children
to stay at school.4 1 Programs were not strictly syllabus oriented, but
were devised to "widen the child's horizon and familiarize [the child]
with facts and situations pertaining to [his] own environment. '49
SITE also offered agricultural programs directed at small or mar-
43. Id.
44. Id. at 204. The project was the result of a Memorandum of Understanding signed on
September 18, 1969 by NASA and India's Department of Atomic Energy. Id.
45. Id. "The main criterion for the selection of the villages was underdevelopment as
defined by India's planning commission." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 204-05. "For instance, Sambalpur district in Orissa speaking [the language]
Orissa, shared program time with Raipur district in Madhya Pradesh where Hindu is spoken."
Id. at 205. One of the two languages was used in the production; the other language was
dubbed-in to match the video. "The programmes were generally not well received when the
voice that was heard was clearly not that of the visible speaker." DBS Education, supra note 2,
at 28, para. 104; see J. FAWCETT, supra note 20, at 65-66.
48. K. QUEENEY, supra note 15, at 205. Village primary schools are drab and unattrac-
tive; only 40% of the students entering class I ever reach class V. The schools are frequently
operated by only one teacher. In addition to the school's unattractive nature, mothers usually
keep their children at home to assist with caring for the family. Id.
49. K. QUEENEY, supra note 15, at 205 (citing First Committee, Provisional Verbatim
Record of the Two Thousand and Fiftieth Meeting (30th Sess. at 39-40, U.N. Doc. A/C. l/PV.
2050 (1969))). Another factor influencing SITE's selection of programming was the difficulty
in coordinating "the subject of a broadcast programme with the subjects being taught on a
particular day in thousands of schools all over a country." DBS Education, supra note 2, at 23,
para. 84. Such coordination is less of an obstacle when the DBS programming is used only to
supplement conventional classroom instruction.
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ginal farmers.50 These programs were closely tied to the actual farm-
ing calendar as the farming season progressed throughout the year.
The programs were shot on location to assist farmers with the con-
crete, practical problems they faced daily in the fields.51 Health and
family welfare programs took the form of nutritional programs based
on improving diet with food "readily available in the village backyard
or kitchen. '5 2 Planned parenthood programs addressed social, eco-
nomic, health and cultural aspects of the problem. "[P]rogrammes on
such controversial topics as family planning would stimulate discus-
sion in cases where people were otherwise very hesitant to raise the
subject, even among friends. ' ' 53 In short, SITE offered approximately
1320 hours of programming devised entirely by the Indians them-
selves to address specific domestic social problems.
5 4
In the eyes of the Indian government, SITE has proven an inval-
uable aid in nation-building.55 From a sociological standpoint, SITE
was dramatically effective in bringing the powerful tool of mass media
to geographically inaccessible villages of people who exist without
even the most basic of modern conveniences, such as electricity. 56
Yet, without having to bear the monumental cost of establishing a
terrestrial broadcast network, ATS-6 provided an instant national tel-
evision network. This allowed villagers to view Indira Gandhi for the
first time and to watch "programs teaching them animal husbandry
and farming. '5 7
50. K. QUEENEY, supra note 15, at 205.
51. Id.
52. Id. India suffers a high incidence of malnutrition among village mothers and chil-
dren. Id.
53. DBS Education, supra note 2, at 22, para. 82.
54. K. QUEENEY, supra note 15, at 205. ATS-6 provided broadcasts for four hours per
day, 1-1/2 hours in the morning for primary education and 2-1/2 hours at night for adult
educational programming and entertainment. Id.
55. Id. at 206. As of 1978, only two television stations served all of India. "Since the
population is relatively evenly distributed over half a million villages throughout the country,
it would be extremely difficult to use conventional television broadcast facilities located in a
few urban centers to cover a large proportion of the largely illiterate population." Id. at 222.
56. Id.
For the [SITE] project, most receivers were placed in electrified villages, but 180 non-
electrified villages were selected for battery powered sets. These batteries were
recharged once a week by a visiting maintenance crew. While this system was more
expensive in initial cost and in maintenance, these sets gave more reliable service than
other sets which were visited less frequently and which sometimes suffered from volt-
age fluctuations in the power lines. In two villages, solar panels were used success-
fully to recharge the batteries.
DBS Education, supra note 2, at 18, para. 61.
57. K. QUEENEY, supra note 15, at 222. With regard to political communications in
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J.
India's tremendous social problems finally were being solved by
education and communication directed to education. 58 For the first
time, using the technology afforded by DBS, an "entire subcontinent
was brought within reach of a single broadcasting point."'59 As a re-
sult of SITE's success, it has been viewed as a model for developing
countries desiring the future services of DBS. 60
Another experimental DBS project which met with similar suc-
cess was Canada's Communications Technology Satellite (CTS). 61
Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding with the Canadian De-
partment of Communications (DOC), NASA launched the CTS into
geostationary orbit in January of 1976.62 CTS was designed and built
by the DOC. NASA provided the satellite's high efficiency 200-watt
traveling tube for the transmitter. NASA also provided a model 2914
Delta launch vehicle, while the European Space Agency (ESA) con-
tributed the blanket and solar cells for the deployable solar array,
"the 20-watt traveling wave tubes and parametric amplifier units for
the spacecraft transponder.
'63
CTS' purpose was to provide broadcasting service and telecom-
munications on an experimental basis to the northern sector of Can-
ada. 64 The northern sector is characterized by harsh winters, barren
terrain and sparse settlements. 65 Aside from the need to provide
broadcasting service to a large, unserviced area of the country, Cana-
dian planners foresaw expanding exploitation of the natural resources
general, it is important that the technology should not merely bring the "message from the
bureaucrat to the masses but, instead, create a true dialogue between the two." Jackhu &
Singal, supra note 4, at 402.
58. K. QUEENEY, supra note 15, at 122.
59. Id. "The most significant achievement of the ATS-6 has been its successful demon-
stration of the practicality of direct satellite broadcasts to small, simple, low-cost ground sta-
tions and the uses of this service to bring high-quality education and health information to
remote, sparsely settled, or widespread populations." Id. at 223.
60. Id. at 206.
61. Id. CTS was made even more powerful than ATS-6 to permit the use of small, low-
cost terminals for reception to make practical satellite communications to remote areas. Id.
62. Id. at 209. CTS was placed over the equator, west of South America. Once situated,
the Canadian Department of Communications Research commenced operation of the satellite
from their Ottawa ground station. Id.
63. Id. at 207.
64. Id. Approximately eighty percent of Canada's population of 22 million live in a nar-
row belt across Canada 100 miles from the United States border. Only 800,000 people live
sprinkled throughout the remaining seventy percent of Canada's territory. The northern pop-
ulation is composed of approximatedly 17,000 Canadian Inuit (Eskimos) and 600,000 Cana-
dian Indians. Id.
65. Id.
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in the North and predicted a concommitant relocation of a large por-
tion of its population as a result.66 An efficient telecommunications
system was therefore a necessity for the country's economic growth.
A recent United Nations study suggests that, "in addition to
broadcasting educational programming produced specifically for
[DBS]," the satellite system could also broadcast cultural programs,
current events, interviews and news.67 Such programs perform a gen-
eral educational purpose and are part of regular television broadcast-
ing in almost all countries possessing national broadcasting
facilities. 6
The United Nations further found that students were less resis-
tant to the new technology where television broadcasts were used to
introduce new educational forms outside of the traditional classroom
setting.69 One such form is "distance education," where educational
radio or television is combined with readings and exercises provided
by correspondence or periodic direct student-teacher interaction.
70
Given the huge success enjoyed by these programs, it is not sur-
prising that an increasing number of countries desire to avail them-
selves of the benefits of DBS technology. But are such systems
economically feasible for developing nations?
B. The Cost of Domestic DBS Systems
With regard to the cost of implementing a DBS system which
can be used for nationwide broadcasting service, the United Nations
has calculated that a fully operational DBS system could cost a mini-
mum of two hundred million dollars.71 This cost would cover three
satellites, two launches and the ground control and transmission facil-
ities. 72 "Uplink stations" (which send the signal to the satellite for
broadcasting) cost approximately $250,000 per station for a one-chan-
66. Id. at 208.
67. DBS Education, supra note 2, at 20, para. 74.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 22, para. 81.
70. Id. China, Britain, Australia, Canada, Indonesia and the USSR have such programs
in operation. Id.
71. Id. at 25, para. 95. "For many developing countries, these costs may be greater than
the total national budget for education and could not be diverted from present activities in any
case." Id.
72. Id. Although a complete DBS system could be established using only one satellite,
most operators build two or three satellites to safeguard against the significant possibility of
failure of a satellite. Frequently, operators choose to have one operational satellite, a spare
satellite in orbit and a second spare satellite on the ground. Id. at 15, para. 52.
1987]
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nel facility. 73 If a country were to operate its own satellite, the neces-
sary tracking, telemetry and control stations would cost
approximately two million dollars. 74 The cost of the satellites them-
selves range from thirty-five million dollars for a "conventional com-
munication satellite requiring no research and development," to one
hundred forty million dollars for a satellite with sixteen high power
direct broadcasting channels. 75 Launch costs were estimated to range
from twenty to thirty million dollars for DBS of modest size, while
larger satellites requiring larger launch vehicles could cost between
fifty to eighty million dollars to launch. 76 Additionally, insurance
against failure of the satellite on launch or in actual orbit was esti-
mated to cost between five and fifteen percent of the total cost of the
satellite and launch. 77 Programming is also quite costly.
7s
The cost of implementing DBS necessitates that any developing
nation considering such a network should carefully assess its own
broadcasting and educational needs. 79 Given different national priori-
ties, such an expenditure could perhaps be more easily justified as an
acquisition of a nationwide telecommunications service rather than as
only the purchase of an educational aid.
8 0
The United Nations has made numerous suggestions for improv-
ing the cost-efficiency of implementing a DBS system. Developing
countries could share the cost of the satellite, either with "other do-
mestic services or with other countries or both."' l Countries who
share a multi-channel system would each have full-time use of one or
more channels.8 2 Multi-national cost sharing would be the simplest
form of sharing, as each country would have complete autonomy and
73. Id. at 19, para. 66.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 16, para. 53.
76. Id. at para. 54.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 24-25, para. 91-94.
"The SITE programme, for example, using simple equipment but including graphics
and on-location recording, produced about 1,400 hours of programming for a total
cost of about $4,000,000 or about $3,000 per hour of programming. About two
thirds of this was hardware costs and one third, or about $1,000 per hour of pro-
gramming, was the operational costs of programme production."
Id. The subsequent evaluation of SITE, however, revealed that this production was insufficient
to keep up with the volume of programming required and producers were unable to give ade-
quate attention to the educational quality of the programs. Id.
79. Id. at 24, para. 88; see also Jackhu & Singal, supra note 4, at 401.
80. DBS Education, supra note 2, at 16, para. 55.
81. Id. at 25-26, para. 95.
82. Id. at 26, para. 96.
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control over the use of its channels.8 3 Other proposed forms of shar-
ing include time-sharing individual channels (where one country has
the use of the channel during certain hours and another country uses
the channel during other hours) and even simultaneous use of a chan-
nel by two or more countries where they share the actual educational
programming.84
The United Nations further proposed that
[a] large international multi-channel multi-satellite system with
steerable spot beams can provide a flexibility for meeting the spe-
cific scheduling needs of a large number of countries over a large
geographic area. While the satellite system would be expensive, it
might offer the lowest cost per country to countries not requiring
full-time service .... 85 Such a service could be offered by an ex-
isting organization, such as Intelsat, Intersputnik, Eutelsat or
Arabsat, perhaps by adding broadcasting transponders onto
planned communications satellites, or could be provided by a new
organization established for the purpose.86
Should a country decide that its needs justify the use of such
technology, it is important that international law provide a forum for
the peaceful resolution of any disputes which may arise from its use.
Unfortunately, existing law provides no such assistance.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING DBS
A. The Outer Space Treaty
Commentators have observed that "[o]f the five U.N. space trea-
ties, only the Outer Space Treaty ... appears applicable to DBS.
' 8 7
Although at the time the Outer Space Treaty was ratified there was
great international concern over the possibility of signals being broad-
83. Id. at para. 97.
84. Id. at 26-27, paras. 98-103.
85. Id. at 27, para. 100.
86. Id. at para. 101.
87. Comment, Current and Future Legal Uses of Direct Broadcast Satellites in Interna-
tional Law, 45 LA. L. REV. 701, 703 (1985). The "Outer Space Treaty" is fully entitled the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S.
No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. Id. at
703 n. 11.
The four additional U.N. space treaties are as follows:
(1) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, Dec. 5, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/Res./34/68 (1979), reprinted in S. GOROVE, UNITED STATES
SPACE LAW: NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL REGULATION, Binder III, II.A.7. (1985) [here-
inafter S. GOROVE]. This agreement has not been signed by the United States. The signatories
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cast directly into a country without that country's prior consent, the
Outer Space Treaty does not specifically mention direct broadcasting
satellites. 88 The treaty merely states general principles applicable to
the exploitation and use of outer space. The failure to mention DBS
only indicates that the member states were unable to come to agree-
ment at the time the treaty became effective. 89 However, certain of
the treaty's general provisions provide basic guidelines controlling the
use of DBS.
The preamble to the Outer Space Treaty indicates that the au-
thors took into account the United Nations General Assembly Reso-
lution 110(II) of November 3, 1947, "which condemned propaganda
designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression. . ." and that they considered
the resolution applied to activities in outer space.90 Although the pre-
amble is not binding on the signatories to a treaty, "Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that the preamble of
a treaty is to be considered in any attempt to divine the intent of the
signatories as expressed in the body of the treaty." 91
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty mandates that signatory
states use outer space "for the benefit and in the interest of all coun-
tries."'92 The mere existence of DBS in outer space cannot harm
countries; rather, it is a particular use of DBS which creates the threat
to a country.
93
Article I further states that "[o]uter space ... shall be free for
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind,
on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and
are Austria, Chile, France, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Netherlands, Peru, Phillipines, Ruma-
nia, and Uruguay. S. GOROVE, supra, Binder III, II.A.7, at 9.
(2) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, April 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672
U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Treaty], reprinted in S. GOROVE, supra, Binder
III, II.A.3.
(3) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480 [hereinafter Registration Treaty], reprinted in S. GOROVE,
supra, Binder III, II.A.5.
(4) Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter Liability Treaty], reprinted in
S. GOROVE, supra, Binder III, II.A.4.
88. Comment, supra note 87, at 704.
89. Id.
90. S. GOROVE, supra note 87, Binder III, II.A.2. at 5.
91. Comment, supra note 87, at 704.
92. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 87, art. II.
93. Comment, supra note 87, at 704.
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there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies."' 94 It has not
been successfully argued that this language assures anything other
than a right of access to outer space,95 although arguments might be
advanced that economic and/or scientific under-development may be
a form of discrimination since only developed countries can techno-
logically exploit outer space. Although the first paragraph in Article
I states that exploration and the use of outer space must be for the
benefit and best interests of all countries, "irrespective of their degree
of economic or scientific development, ' 96 there is no support for the
proposition that developing countries are assured equality of partici-
pation in the outer space activities and projects of developed nations.
In other words, these provisions do not require developing na-
tions to bear the economic burden of projects by developing nations
simply because the latter share a right of access to the benefits of outer
space. The United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for
example, expressed concern over this issue during hearings prior to
the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967. 9 7 In response to
the questions on the possibility that Article I would require the
United States to make its communications satellites available for the
benefit of all countries, Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg responded
that Article I was only a statement of general goals, and that separate
international agreements were necessary to cover the use of particular
satellites. 98 In reliance upon this interpretation, the Committee noted
"in its Report that '[i]t is the understanding of the Committee on For-
eign Relations that nothing in Article I, paragraph 1, of the Treaty
diminishes or alters the right of the United States to determine how it
shares the benefits and results of its space activities.' "99
Furthermore, Article II of the treaty states that "[o]uter space
... is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by
94. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 87, art. I.
95. Comment, supra note 87, at 705.
96. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 87, art. I.
97. I MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 1, 41 n.47 (N. Jasentuliyana & R. Lee eds. 1979) [herein-
after N. Jasentuliyana] (citing "Treaty on Outer Space," 1967 Hearings on Executive D,
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-37 (March and April
1967)) [hereinafter Hearings]. Chapter 1 of Jasentuliyana provides a commentary written by
Paul Dembling on the draft history and ratification history of the Outer Space Treaty. Mr.
Dembling is a Professional Lecturer at the George Washington National Law Centre and for-
mer General Counsel for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 41 n.47 (citing Hearings, supra note 97, at 4).
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means of use or occupation, or by any other means."' ° For the pur-
poses of DBS, it might be argued that it is the geostationary orbit
which is being "appropriated."'' 0 1 This language has not, however,
been interpreted by scholars or by the United Nations Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to prohibit the use of
natural resources. 0 2 The treaty has not been interpreted to change
the "first come, first served" policy which countries have followed
since the beginning of space exploration.10
3
Article III requires the "States Parties to the Treaty [to] ... carry
on the activities in the exploration and use of outer space ... in ac-
cordance with international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and secur-
ity and promoting international cooperation and understanding."'0
4
While this language arguably bans the broadcasting of political propa-
ganda via DBS into non-consenting countries, it may equally be ar-
gued that even political broadcasts serve to promote international
cooperation and understanding by informing the receiver of a wide
range of political philosophies. Article III thus does not provide ef-
fective regulation of DBS broadcasting.
0 5
Article IV prohibits party states from placing in Earth orbit "any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of
mass destruction . . ." Even as a tool of political propaganda, it
would be difficult to argue that a direct broadcasting satellite is a
"weapon of mass destruction." Consequently, Article IV provides no
regulation of DBS use. Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty pro-
vides that
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space ... and each State Party
from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is interna-
tionally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to
its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component
parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space. 10 6
Although it could be argued that propaganda transmitted via DBS
100. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 87, art. II.
101. Comment, supra note 87, at 704.
102. Gorove, Implications of International Space Law for Private Enterprise, 7 ANNALS
AIR & SPACE LAW 319, 321 (1982).
103. Comment, supra note 87, at 705.
104. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 87, art. III.
105. Comment, supra note 87, at 705.
106. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 87, art. VII.
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constitutes "damage" to a State's natural or juridical persons, this ar-
gument has failed with regard to the Liability Treaty which contains
similar language. There, the liability attaches to damage caused by
the object itself, not emanations from it. 107
The Outer Space Treaty thus provides only general principles
pertaining to DBS regulation. These broad provisions have been
viewed as permitting any peaceful use of outer space, pending the es-
tablishment of specific operative principles. 08
B. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is the "or-
ganization which has, over the years, taken over the responsibility of
formulating policy and legal regulations relating to space telecommu-
nications." 10 9 ITU has been a specialized agency of the United Na-
tions since 1945 and its present authority derives from the
International Telecommunications Convention of 1973.110 The "Con-
vention has been ratified by every nation on Earth and binds them
with treaty force."'I
One of ITU's central purposes is to function as a vehicle for in-
ternational co-operation to improve and rationally use telecommuni-
cation services." 12 To facilitate this purpose, ITU allocates the radio
frequency spectrum and maintains registration of radio frequency as-
signments to prevent harmful interference between radio stations.' 13
Additionally, ITU formulates regulations governing space telecom-
munications via intergovernmental World Administrative Radio Con-
ferences (WARCs). 114 "Once they are formulated, these regulations
... are annexed to the ITU Convention and have treaty force."" 5
At the WARC for Space Telecommunications (WARC-ST) of
1971, ITU allocated frequency assignments to the broadcasting satel-
lite service for the first time. 1 6 The new regulations defined broad-
107. Comment, supra note 87, at 703. "Obviously, this restriction does not include 'ema-
nations' (such as nuclear radiation) more appropriately considered in light of the [Outer Space
Treaty's] prohibition against weapons of mass destruction." Id. at n. 16.
108. Id. at 706.
109. N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 196.
110. Id.
111. Comment, supra note 87, at 706.
112. N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 196.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 202.
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casting satellite service as "radio communications service in which
signals transmitted or re-transmitted by space stations are intended
for direct reception by the general public." ' 1 7 Many countries, pri-
marily developing ones, feared the potential danger of unrestricted
satellite broadcasting. They insisted that Article 7 of the Radio Regu-
lations be revised to ensure that before a broadcasting satellite service
was established, there would be a prior agreement between countries
who might not want the transmissions or whose services would be
disrupted by spill-over from such transmissions.' 18 Hence, ITU re-
vised Article 7 to mandate that "all technical means available shall be
used to reduce to the maximum extent practicable the radiation over
territory of other countries unless an agreement has been previously
reached with such countries."' 19 Some states asserted that this provi-
sion established a requirement of "prior consent;" however, a
stronger argument has been made that Article 7 merely sets a general
technical guideline in an effort to reduce the spill-over threat and does
not act as an absolute prohibition of spill-over.120
The WARC for the Planning of the Broadcasting Satellite Service
(WARC-BS) of 1977 adopted a "Plan" for broadcasting satellite ser-
vice in ITU regions 1 and 3.121 The plan permitted "individual recep-
117. Id. (citing Radio Regulations, Article 1, 84AP, 84 APA, 84 APB-Spa 2). See supra
text accompanying footnotes 25-27.
118. N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 203. Direct broadcasting satellites have a very
large "footprint" or service area in that a DBS broadcasting from a geostationary orbit would
"illuminate an area of one million square miles (approximately the area of India, and slightly
less than one-third the area of the continental United States)." Comment, supra note 87, at
708 (citing C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 606
(1982)); see Comment, Explorations in Space Law.- An Examination of the Legal Issues Raised
by Geo-stationary, Remote Sensing, and Direct Broadcasting Satellites, 29 N.Y. L. SCH. L.
REV. 687, 737 (1985). Countries are thus concerned that even an intended domestic applica-
tion of DBS will result in broadcast "spill-over" across borders, defeating the traditionally
recognized right of sovereign states to "regulate their communication systems and to decide in
the light of social, political, economic, cultural and other considerations the type of broadcast-
ing services they require." N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 219; see also J. FAWCETT, supra
note 20, at 68.
119. N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 203.
120. Comment, supra note 87, at 708. Those who view 428A SPA 2 as providing only
generally technical and administrative guidelines argue that "any other interpretation would
undermine and regressively depart from vital concepts of free flow of information and ex-
change of ideas." N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 219.
121. N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 207. "For the purpose of administrative confer-
ences, the world is divided into three regions: Region I covers Europe (including the whole of
the territory of the USSR) and Africa; Region 2 covers the Americas and Region 3 covers Asia
and Australasia." The First Session of the World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use
of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the Planning of the Space Services Utilizing It [WAR C-
ORB(])], press release ITU/85-15, 16 September 1985, p. 1, n.2 [hereinafter WARC-ORB()].
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tion, using antennae under one meter in diameter, such as could
readily be installed in individual homes."' 122 Under the plan, broad-
casting satellite service would only be used for domestic broadcasting;
intercountry signal transmission was prohibited unless the affected
states specifically agreed to state-to-state broadcasting. 123 In conjunc-
tion with Regulation 428A SPA 2, it was anticipated that the effects
of spill-over would be minimized due to the absence or unavailability
of the requisite special receiving antennas and their accompanying
electronics, in neighboring states within the "footprint" which do not
wish to receive the transmission. 24 However, such regulations are
based on technological limitations and not legal principles. Further-
more, given ITU's inability to effectively enforce its regulations, 125
most countries, including the Soviet Union and developing countries,
agree that the ITU regulations are primarily of technical and adminis-
trative value but "[do] not eliminate the inherent political and legal
problems in [DBS], which need clear, agreed legal principles to avoid
future conflicts."'
126
C. The United Nations
The United Nations itself has not remained idle in addressing
these political and legal problems. In 1968, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly authorized COPUOS to form a working group "to
study and report on the technical feasibility of communication by di-
rect broadcast from satellites and the current and foreseeable develop-
ments in this field, including comparative user costs and other
economic considerations, as well as the implications of such develop-
ments in the social, cultural, legal and other areas."' 127 The August
1969 report of the Working Group predicted benefits from DBS in the
form of improved health and education, increased flow of news and
information, improved intercultural programs and the development of
122. Rice, Regulation of Direct Broadcast Satellites: International Constraints and Domes-
tic Options, 25 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 813, 818 (1980).
123. N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 207.
124. Id. at 207.
125. Id. at 215-16.
To date, violations of international agreements have been committed by several coun-
tries, especially in space radio activities .... Since no more effective sanctions for
violations are available than the irate letters of protest exchanged between the For-
eign Offices, the current system of legal regulation of international radio and televi-
sion practices is ineffective with regard to sanctioning violations.
Id.
126. Id. at 220.
127. Id. at 283 (citing G. A. Res. 2453 B (XXIII), U.N. Doc. A/7462 (1968)).
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closer ties between peoples of different countries and within their own
countries. 128 DBS would benefit developing countries by accelerating
their domestic integration programs, economic programs, health and
education programs, agriculture, communal development and cul-
tural programs.1 29 The report, however, cautioned against the poten-
tial adverse effects which DBS broadcasts could have as a result of
broadcast spill-over into countries whose governments did not desire
to receive the transmissions. 130
Four general approaches have been suggested to deal with the
problem of receipt of DBS broadcasts by countries whose govern-
ments do not desire them.' The first approach is the technical ap-
proach adopted by ITU discussed above, which attempts to overcome
the spill-over problem by requiring that DBS satellites have limited
"footprints" to the greatest extent permitted by technology. 132
Although helpful, these requirements fail to effectively deal with the
problem; it is impossible to force a DBS beam to conform with the
shape of a country's borders and, hence, some spill-over is technologi-
cally unavoidable.1 33 Also, technical regulations may assist in limit-
ing unintentional broadcasts into other countries, but fail to regulate
intentional transborder DBS broadcasts.
The second approach, offered by Canada and Sweden, proposes
the actual establishment and operation of regional and other DBS sys-
tems. Through the actual participation and co-operation of groups of
countries in operating the DBS systems, countries would be directly
involved in resolving programming and broadcast problems.1 34
The third approach is embodied in the Declaration of Guiding
Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of
Information, the Spread of Education, and Greater Cultural Ex-
change of October 1972 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 135 The Declaration expressed
the views of a number of developing countries that a more strictly
regulatory approach was needed, involving the establishment of gen-
128. Id. at 284 (citing U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/50 (1968)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 285-88.
132. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 118-26.
133. N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 285-88.
134. Id. at 285-86.
135. Id. at 286 (referring to UNESCO document 17 C/98, 14 November 1972) [hereinaf-
ter Declaration].
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eral and specific principles to govern the activity. 3 6 Specific provi-
sions in the Declaration included Article VII(l) which states:
Each country has the right to decide on the content of the educa-
tional programs broadcast by satellite to its people and, in cases
where such programmes are produced in co-operation with other
countries, to take part in their planning and production, on a free
and equal footing. 1
37
Article XI mandates "prior agreements concerning direct satel-
lite broadcasting to the population of countries other than the country
of origin of the transmission" and further requires specific agreements
governing the use of DBS for commercial advertising.'
38
The fourth approach took the form of the Soviet Union's submis-
sion, in August 1972, of a draft entitled "Convention on Principles
Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct
Television Broadcasting."'' 39 The draft resembled the UNESCO pro-
posal in that it contained general principles and included the require-
ment that states who are to receive DBS broadcasts must give their
express, prior consent. 14° The Soviet Union's proposal, however,
went far beyond the UNESCO approach in five significant ways. "
41
First, it stated that transmissions into foreign states without their
express prior consent were illegal and would result in international
liability on the part of broadcasting states. 142 Second, six categories of
illegal programs were identified which included broadcasts "propa-
gandizing violence, horrors, pornography and the use of narcotics.'
43
Third, it allowed a state to "employ the means at its disposal to
counteract illegal television broadcasting, of which it is the object, not
only in its own territory but also in outer space and other areas be-
yond the limits of the national jurisdiction of any state."' 44 Fourth,
states were to be held responsible for all broadcasts by their nation-
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Declaration, supra note 135, at art. VI(2)).
138. Id. at art. XI.
139. Id. at 286-87.
140. Id. at 287.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing art. VI of the Soviet draft).
143. Id. (citing art. VI of the Soviet draft).
144. Id. (citing art. IX of the Soviet draft). This is obviously an extreme view. If the value
of an agreement regulating DBS is to eliminate violence as a remedy for international conflicts
arising from DBS use, such a "self-help" provision allowing an unhappy country to legally
destroy a satellite under authority of international law would clearly frustrate the underlying
peace-keeping purpose for such an international agreement.
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als. 145 Finally, the draft provided that, "all States shall have an equal
right to carry out direct television broadcasting by means of artificial
earth satellites."'
146
The Soviet proposal was rejected on the grounds that such a rig-
idly binding treaty might inhibit the very activity it was meant to gov-
ern. 147  In November of 1972, the United Nations endorsed the
approach offered by UNESCO. 148 As the formulation of principles
for agreement was necessary under UNESCO's regulatory approach,
the United Nations requested that COPUOS establish those principles
at the earliest possible date. 149 On November 12, 1976, the General
Assembly adopted a resolution which recommended that the Legal
Sub-Committee consider the task a matter of high priority.150 This
resolution resulted in the Legal Sub-Committee's re-establishment of
its Working Group on Television Broadcasting as Working Group
11.151
Although COPUOS was able to form draft principles for DBS,
only six of the principles were agreed upon by the delegates. 152 Three
principles preventing agreement concern the crucial issues of prior
consent of the receiving state, regulation of program content and un-
lawful/inadmissible broadcasts.5 3  Essentially, the delegates have
reached an impasse due to the fundamentally opposed ideologies of
145. Id. (citing art. VII of the Soviet draft).
146. Id. (citing art. I of the Soviet draft).
147. Id.
148. Id. The UNESCO proposal appeared to many to be "a compromise between the
rigidity of a binding treaty that might serve to inhibit the activity it was meant to govern and
the laissez-faire situation of no rules at all." Id.
149. Id. at 287-88.
150. Id. at 288 (referring to U.N. Resolution 31/8, 12 November 1976).
151. Id.
152. Comment, supra note 118, at 741. The six principles agreed upon are (1) Purposes
and Objectives, (2) Applicability of International Law, (3) Rights and Benefits, (4) Interna-
tional Co-operation, (5) Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, and (6) Notification to the
United Nations. Id. There has been no agreement regarding (1) Consultation and Agreements
Between States, (2) Programme Content, and (3) Unlawful/Inadmissible Broadcasts. Id. The
remaining principles entitled State Responsibility, Duty and Right to Consult, and Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes are related to the three controversial principles, so there is no agree-
ment as to these either. Id. at 741 n.341 (citing COPUOS, Report of the Legal Sub-Committee
on the Work and Its Twentieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC./105/288 (1981) Annex II, para. 4).
This document was a restatement of the 1980 draft which in turn has its origin in the 1979
draft, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/240, Annex 2, p. 8, 10 April 1979. Christol, supra note 12, at 142
n.2; see also II MANUAL ON SPACE LAW (N. Jasentuliyana & R. Lee eds. 1979), for the text of
the 1978 draft, U.N. A/AC. 105/218 Annex II of 13 April 1978. See infra text accompanying
note 193.
153. Comment, supra note 118, at 741-42.
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one group of countries, which includes the United States, and another
group of countries, which includes the Soviet Union. 1
54
On the one hand, the group of countries that includes the United
States has resisted a prior consent requirement, as well as restrictions
on program content, based on the principle that information should
be permitted to flow freely across international borders. 155  On the
other hand, the Soviet Union and other countries have advocated the
prior consent requirement and express prohibition of certain types of
programs, consistent with the Soviet draft of 1972156 based on a prin-
ciple of the sovereign right to control broadcasts received within their
respective borders. 157 Because these two ideological differences re-
main irreconcilable, the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS has
dropped the discussion of DBS regulation from its agenda. 58
In summation, although the Outer Space Treaty provides some
general principles governing activities in space, the international com-
munity has sought in vain to come to agreement on regulatory princi-
ples for DBS. Unfortunately, because of fundamental ideological
differences among its member States, the United Nations dropped the
matter from its agenda. Consequently, despite the dire need for agree-
ment in the face of increasing domestic DBS use, no international law
exists which directly regulates the use of direct broadcasting satellites.
Because of the importance of geostationary orbital positions to
154. N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 296. "And this opposition turns on more than
their rivalry in space activities. It turns on fundamental divergent conceptions of the basic
values at stake, rooted deeply in their respective ideologies." Id. at 296.
155. "Broadcasting states are able to contend that their national sovereignty allows for
international broadcasts ... and that the principle of free transmission of ideas and informa-
tion has been enshrined in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Chris-
tol, supra note 12, at 155.
156. N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 296.
157. Id. "This has been the major dispute since deliberations on direct-satellite broadcast-
ing began and it remains unresolved." Id.
158. At the twenty-fourth session of the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS, opened
March 18, 1985, the Chairman noted during his opening statement that "[t]he principle objec-
tive of the Sub-Committee's work was the formulation of provisions of texts on which the Sub-
Committee could agree." COPUOS, Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Work of Its
Twenty Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/352, 11 April 1985, at 3, para. 2 [hereinafter
Legal Sub-Comm 24].
The Sub-Committee then adopted an agenda limited to 1) formulating draft principles for
remote sensing, 2) discussing the possibility of supplementing the norms of international law
relevant to the use of nuclear power sources in outer space, and 3) matters relating to the
definition and delimitation of outer space and to the character and utilization of the geostation-
ary orbit, including consideration of ways and means to ensure the rational and equitable use
of the geostationary orbit without prejudice to the role of the International Telecommunica-
tions Union. Id. at 4, para. 4.
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optimum DBS utilization, this Comment briefly examines the current
state of international law governing use of the geostationary orbit.
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE GEOSTATIONARY
ORBIT (GSO)
There are an estimated 290 operable satellites of every type pres-
ently orbiting in space.1 5 9 "The major use of the geostationary orbit is
for communication satellites for which continuity of service, large
area of coverage and fixed pointing antennas are great advantages."
1 60
Because the GSO is a limited natural resource, the international com-
munity is greatly concerned that the geostationary orbit be used effi-
ciently and equitably for the benefit of all nations.
161
In 1976, eight equatorial countries expressed their concern that
developing countries be assured access to the GSO. 162 Their concern
took the form of the Bogota Declaration, which asserted inter alia
that the GSO is a natural resource of the equatorial states and subject
to their sovereignty. 163 Further, the declaration asserted that no ob-
ject could be placed in the GSO without the authorization of the un-
derlying states and that the Outer Space Treaty does not apply to the
GSO.164 Prior to the Bogota Declaration, it had generally been as-
sumed that the GSO was part of outer space and that the Outer Space
Treaty forbade national appropriation of any part of outer space. 65
On the one hand, the developed states which used the GSO for satel-
lites objected to the Bogota Declaration as merely a political instru-
ment unsupported by scientific principles or principles of
international law. 166 Developing countries, on the other hand, ex-
pressed support for the Bogota Declaration because it offered protec-
tion of their interests in the future use of the GSO. 167
While the Bogota Declaration is not considered to be binding on
159. J. ALLEN, ENTERING SPACE: AN ASTRONAUT'S ODYSSEY 98 (1984).
160. GSO Spacing, supra note 34, at 11.
161. Id. at 7, paras. 8-12.
162. Comment, The International Law of Outer Space and its Effect on Commercial Space
Activity, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 521, 557 (1984). "An equatorial state is a country which is
traversed by the Equator. The eight countries were Brazil, Columbia, the Congo, Ecuador,
Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire. Gabon and Somalia are the only equatorial countries
not joining in the declaration." Id. at 557 n.197.
163. Id. at 558.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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non-signatory states since it clearly conflicts with the Outer Space
Treaty's express prohibition against national appropriation of outer
space, the Declaration has served to make the international commu-
nity aware of the concern of developed nations for equitable access to
the GSO.168 The Second United Nations Conference on the Explora-
tion and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 82), held at Vi-
enna in August of 1982, recommended that "[a]ny planning method
... that is evolved for the GSO-RF spectrum should recognize and
accommodate the future needs of developing countries and should not
result in unnecessarily hastening their plans to the detriment of their
financial and self-reliance interests."1 69 UNISPACE 82 also made a
recommendation that, if feasible, ITU should incorporate into its fu-
ture regulations a stipulation requiring each satellite owner to remove
its satellites from the GSO when they are no longer usable so that
additional satellites may be placed in the GSO.' 70  In 1982, the ITU
Convention at Nairobi also recognized that the GSO was a limited
natural resource to be utilized with care.' 7 '
At the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Legal Sub-Committee of
COPUOS, a delegation consisting of Columbia, Ecuador, Indonesia
and Kenya re-introduced a working paper of draft principles gov-
erning the GSO. 172 The delegation advocated the establishment of a
168. Id.
169. List of Conclusions and Recommendations of the Second United Nations Conference
on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 82), U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.
101/11, 18 October 1982, at 8, para. 282 [hereinafter UNISPACE 82].
To minimize the possible future eventuality of an accidental collision between a
"live" space object and a piece of space debris, the international community should,
on the basis of more detailed studies, agree to appropriate measures such as designat-
ing "disposal" orbits, removing from orbit all inactive satellites, minimizing space
debris or even organizing scavenger missions.
Id. at 8, para. 289.
170. Id. at 12, para. 283.
171. Legal Sub-Comm 24, supra note 158, at 32, para. 14.
172. Id. at 34, para. 20. The full text of the working paper, which resembles the Bogota
Declaration of 1976, reads as follows:
Preamble:
Affirming that the geostationary orbit which lies on the equatorial plane and the
existence of which mainly depends on its relation to gravitational phenomena gener-
ated by the Earth is a limited natural resource, and therefore its utilization should be
rational and equitable and exclusively for the benefit of all mankind;
Bearing in mind that the applications of space science and technology relating to
the geostationary orbit are of fundamental importance for the economic, social and
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special legal regime for the geostationary orbit. 173 They argued first
that silence in the Outer Space Treaty regarding the use of the GSO
may be explained by the fact that the GSO was not being considered
by the delegation at the time the Outer Space Treaty was
elaborated. 174
They further argued that ITU regulations provided for GSO allo-
cations on a "first come, first served" basis and that, as a consequence,
the GSO and related frequencies are now approaching saturation to
the point of crisis while being occupied by only a few countries. 17
5
cultural development of the peoples of all States, in particular those of the developing
countries, including the equatorial countries;
Recognizing that the geostationary orbit shall be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes and for the benefit of all mankind;
Noting the urgency of narrowing the gap in the field of space science and tech-
nology between the developed and the developing countries;
Recognizing the need to establish a specific legal regime applicable to the geosta-
tionary orbit which derives from its special physical nature and technical attributes,
taking into account the existing legal regimes governing airspace and outer space.
Principle I: The geostationary orbit shall be used exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses and for the benefit of all mankind.
Principle II: The geostationary orbit is a limited natural resource which shall be
preserved in the interests of all States, taking into account the needs of the developing
countries and the rights of the equatorial States. For that purpose it shall be gov-
erned by a specific legal regime.
Principle III: The equatorial States shall preserve the corresponding segments
of the geostationary orbit superjacent to their territories for the opportune and ap-
propriate utilization of the orbit by all States, particularly the developing countries.
Principle IV: The equatorial States shall have preferential right to the segment
of the geostationary orbit superjacent to the territory under their jurisdiction.
Principle V: The placement of a space object in the segment of the geostationary
orbit superjacent to an equatorial State shall require prior authorization by that
State. Transit for peaceful purposes of any space object through this segment shall be
allowed.
Principle VI: All States shall endeavour to co-operate in the efficient and eco-
nomic utilization of the geostationary orbit on regional and on global basis, directly
or through the United Nations and its specialized agencies and other competent in-
ternational organizations.
Principle VII: The developed countries, international organizations as well as
the developing countries which have already acquired capabilities in space technol-
ogy should take necessary steps to facilitate and accelerate space science and technol-
ogy transfers to other developing countries to achieve capabilities in the use of the
geostationary orbit to serve their national development objectives.
Principle VIII: States and/or international organizations operating their space
objects in the geostationary orbit shall take necessary actions to remove non-opera-
tional or unutilized space objects from the orbit.
Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia and Kenya: Working Paper, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/C.2/
L.147 of 29 March 1984, reprinted in Legal Sub-Comm 24, supra note 158, at 39-41.
173. Id. at 32, para. 14.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 33. It must be noted, however, that at the 1979 WARC, ITU had formally
endorsed the principle that all countries would have equal rights to use the GSO and the
frequency bands which had been allocated to the space radiocommunication services. WARC-
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The continued monopoly of the GSO and consistent replacement of
spent satellites by the few countries currently operating satellites posi-
tioned in the GSO would soon result in there being no usable space
for future use by developing countries. 176 Finally, the delegation ar-
gued that the developing countries are entitled to equitable access to
the GSO on a basis other than on a "first come, first served basis,"
and therefore, the United Nations should establish principles gov-
erning the equitable use of the GSO by all countries. 177
The provisions of the delegation's working paper are clearly
traceable to the principles enunciated in the Bogota Declaration of
1976. Although the paper makes no specific mention of the rights of
the equatorial states arising from sovereign powers, the language of
Principle IV reserving preferential right to the segment of the geosta-
tionary orbit superjacent to the territory under the jurisdiction of the
equatorial states, and the language of Principle V requiring the prior
consent of the equatorial states clearly spring from notions of sover-
eignty over portions of space. 178
Furthermore, other delegations agreed that the GSO requires a
special legal regime which should consider the interests of the devel-
oping countries. However, these delegations were unable to agree
that equatorial countries should have special rights to segments of the
geostationary orbit superjacent to their territories merely because of
their geographical location. 179 Yet, these delegations conceded, equi-
table access to the GSO by all countries would be frustrated by alloca-
tion of the GSO on a "first come, first served" basis. 180
By contrast, the developed nations argued that the GSO should
be considered an inseparable part of outer space and, therefore,
should not be subject to national appropriation under the provisions
of the Outer Space Treaty.' 8' Still other delegations echoed the view
that the GSO should be considered part of outer space and subject to
the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty preventing national appro-
priation. However, they contended that there was presently no neces-
ORB(]), supra note 121, at 2. Additionally, the 1979 WARC's Resolution No. 3 provided that
a two-session WARC "was to be convened to guarantee in practice for all countries, equitable
access to the GSO and the frequency bands allocated to the space services using it." Id.
176. Legal Sub-Comm 24, supra note 158, at 33.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 39-41.
179. Id. at 33, para. 16.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 33, para. 17.
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sity to establish principles for regulating the GSO since ITU had
scheduled WARC's for 1985 and 1988 which would afford suitable
forums for formulating such regulations. 8 2 Their contention was de-
bated by other delegations who stressed the need for legal principles
for regulation in light of the inability of ITU to cope with technologi-
cal trends and certain countries' monopolies of the GSO.1
8 3
Part of the difficulty faced by the delegations constituting the
Working Group of the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS on the
182. Id. at 34, para. 18. The 1985 WARC was the first of its kind in history. Its principal
task was "to decide which space services and frequency bands should be planned and establish
the technical criteria and the planning method(s) to be used." WARC-ORB(1), supra note 121,
at 1. For five weeks, the conference struggled to find a balanced solution which would allow
any member of ITU to begin a satellite service based on equality. This solution would have to
also unhamper the development of satellite technology aimed at improving use of the fre-
quency spectrum and economic viability in light of rapidly evolving telecommunications tech-
nology. Id. at 2.
183. Legal Sub-Comm 24, supra note 158, at 34, para. 18. The results of the 1985 WARC
fell into two categories: Final Acts, and a report to the Second Session of the conference
scheduled to meet in 1988. WARC-ORB(1), supra note 121, at 2.
The Final Acts of the 1985 WARC involved the formal incorporation of the decisions of
the Members of Region 2 (the Americas) during the 1983 Regional Broadcasting-Satellite
Conference (SAT-R2) into the Radio Regulations as Appendix 30 (ORB-85) and Appendix
30A. Id. at 2-3. The central purpose of SAT-R2 was to design "a detailed plan of frequency
assignments and orbital positions for geostationary satellites in the broadcasting-satellite ser-
vice in Region 2." Id. at 3. Similar plans for Regions 1 and 3 had been adopted in 1977, and
were incorporated into the Radio Regulations by WARC 1979. Id. See also supra notes 113-
26 and accompanying text. The result is a comprehensive and definite World Agreement for
the planning and establishment of direct television broadcasting in the frequency bands con-
cerned. WARC-ORB(J), supra note 121, at 3. However, the plan will be limited solely to
national systems providing domestic services, yet will allow for multilateral, regional agree-
ments for possible sub-regional joint services. Id. at 4.
The report to the Second Session consists of eight chapters, two Resolutions, and three
Recommendations. Id. at 3-4. It proposes the planning principles and planning method to
govern the use of the GSO and the space services utilizing the orbit. Id. at 4. "The planning
principles provide for equitable and guaranteed access to the orbit while keeping flexibility and
efficiency in its use. They also take into account existing systems, the technical aspects of
special geographical situations, and the provisions for multi-service/multi-band networks."
Id. at para. 3.4.
Additionally, the report to the Second Session recognized the "possibility of setting aside
portions of the orbit/spectrum resource to accommodate unforseen [sic] requirements and re-
quirements of future members of the Union after all requirements have been satisfied." Id. at
para. 3.6. In so doing, the First Session adopted the "principle that administrations.., are not
entitled to permanent priority in the use of particular frequencies and GSO positions in such a
way as to foreclose access by other administrations to the GSO and the frequency bands allo-
cated to space services." Id. Thus, ITU has expressed a very strong position against allowing
the formation of monopolies of the GSO. Furthermore, ITU's purported inability to enforce
its regulations may be somewhat mitigated by the fact that the 1985 WARC was attended by
over 900 delegates from 111 countries, including both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Id. at 1.
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GSO stems from issues concerning the delimitation and definition of
outer space.' 8 4 While countries can exercise sovereign control over
their airspace, the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty mandate that
outer space may not be nationally appropriated. The problem is one
of defining where airpace ends and outer space begins.
While some delegations urged that such a definition is necessary
so that countries may properly abide by their treaty obligations, other
delegations argued that such a definition is presently unnecessary and
that any attempt at establishing a boundary between airspace and
outer space would be at best an arbitrary selection of an altitude.' 8
5
They argued that such a definition should only be made when it be-
comes a practical necessity to do so. Since no difficulty has arisen to
date in the absence of such a definition, none should presently be
made. 186 Furthermore, any unnecessary definition might hinder fur-
ther development and exploitation of space; this is clearly against the
policy enunciated in the existing space treaties. 8 7
The debate concerning the geostationary orbit and the delimita-
tion and definition of outer space has raged for the past ten years
without the delegations substantially altering their respective posi-
tions. It is therefore highly unlikely that an agreement will soon be
forthcoming. 188 However, some form of international agreement is
urgently needed. As time passes, countries currently receiving in-
creased allocations of the GSO will be less willing to give up their
slots, thereby making any future agreement increasingly difficult. Ad-
ditionally, the failure to come to an international agreement concern-
ing the preservation of the GSO's environment, given increasing
amounts of space debris in the form of "dead" satellites and other
abandoned man-made articles, also adds to the cumulative problem of
GSO management.18
9
VI. PROPOSAL: AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY
A clear and immediate need for an agreement concerning the
legal regulation of international direct television broadcasting exists.
For the last ten years, the United Nations has recognized the need for
such an agreement and has made it a top priority item on the agenda
184. Legal Sub-Comm 24, supra note 158, at 31, para. 9.
185. Id. at 31-32, para. 9.
186. Id. at 32, para. 12.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 32, para. 13.
189. Id. at 34, para. 22.
1987]
406 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. [Vol. 9:377
of COPUOS.190 Unfortunately, COPUOS' diligent efforts have failed
to result in the much-needed DBS agreement. Notwithstanding the
absence of an agreement, many countries have implemented, or are in
the process of implementing, operational DBS systems. This in-
creased use of DBS has only served to increase the need for regulatory
principles.
The international community has been unable to resolve three
crucial issues concerning DBS use: prior consent of the receiving
state, regulation of program content and unlawful/inadmissible
broadcasts. 191 Unfortunately, inability to agree on these three issues
caused COPUOS' Legal Sub-Committee to drop the subject of DBS
regulation from its agenda. 192 The COPUOS Working Groups have,
however, come to agreement on the following elements of a preamble
and principles for the regulation of DBS.
The General Assembly
(1) In view of the benefits of international direct television
broadcasting by means of artificial earth satellites for individuals,
peoples, countries, and all mankind,
(2) Desiring to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests
of all States and to encourage orderly development on an equitable
basis of this new and promising means of television broadcasting,
(3) Recognizing the unique characteristics of such satellite
broadcasting not encountered in other forms of broadcasting which
necessitate besides relevant technical regulations also legal princi-
ples solely applicable in this field,
(4) Considering that States, as well as international govern-
mental and non-governmental organizations, including broadcast-
ing associations, should base their activities in this field upon and
encourage international co-operation,
(5) Solemnly declares that in international direct television
broadcasting by means of artificial earth satellites, States should be
guided by the following principles:
Purposes and Objectives
States declare that activities in the field of international direct
television broadcasting by means of artificial earth satellites should
be carried out in a manner compatible with the development of
mutual understanding and the strengthening of friendly relations
and co-operation among all States and peoples in the interest of
190. See supra text accompanying notes 149-51.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 152-57.
192. See supra text accompanying note 158.
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maintaining international peace and security. Such activities
should, inter alia, promote the dissemination and mutual exchange
of information and knowledge in cultural and scientific fields, assist
in educational, social and economic development, particularly in
the developing countries, enhance the quality of life of all peoples
and provide beneficial recreation.
Applicability of International Law
Activities in the field of direct television broadcasting by
means of artificial earth satellites should be conducted in accord-
ance with international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations, the Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and other Celestial Bodies of 27 January 1967, the relevant provi-
sions of the International Telecommunications Convention and its
Radio Regulations and of international instruments relating to
friendly relations and co-operation among States and to human
rights.
Rights and Benefits
Every State has an equal right to conduct activities in the field
of direct television broadcasting by means of artificial earth satel-
lites and to authorize such activities by persons and entities under
its jurisdiction. All States and peoples are entitled to and should
enjoy the benefits from such activities. Access to the technology in
this field should be available to all States without discrimination on
terms mutually agreed by all concerned.
International Co-operation
Activities in the field of direct television broadcasting by
means of artificial earth satellites should be based upon and en-
courage international co-operation. Such co-operation should be
the subject of appropriate arrangements.
State Responsibility
States should bear international responsibility for activities in
the field of direct television broadcasting by means of artificial
earth satellites carried out by them or under their jurisdiction and
for the conformity of any such activities with the principles set
forth in this document.
When direct television broadcasting by means of artificial
earth satellites is carried out by an international intergovernmental
organization, responsibility for compliance with these principles
should be borne both by such organization and by States partici-
pating in it.
Duty and Right to Consult
Any State requested to do so by another State should
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promptly enter into consultations with the requesting State con-
cerning any matter arising from those activities in the field of inter-
national direct television broadcasting by satellites that are likely
to affect the requesting State, and such consultations should be
conducted with due regard to the other principles of this
document.
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
Any dispute that may arise from activities in the field of direct
television broadcasting by means of artificial earth satellites should
be resolved by prompt consultations among the parties to the dis-
pute. Where a mutually acceptable resolution cannot be achieved
by such consultations, it should be sought through other estab-
lished procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Copyright and Neighbouring Rights.
Without prejudice to the relevant provisions of international
law States should co-operate on a bilateral and multilateral basis
for protection of copyright and neighbouring rights by means of
appropriate agreements between the interested States. In such co-
operation they should give special consideration to the interests of
developing countries in the use of direct television broadcasting for
the purpose of accelerating their national development.
Notification to the United Nations
In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space, States conducting or authoriz-
ing activities in the field of direct television broadcasting by satel-
lites should inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations to
the greatest extent possible of the nature of such activities. On re-
ceiving this information, the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions should disseminate it immediately and effectively to the
relevant United Nations specialized agencies, as well as to the pub-
lic and the international scientific community.
193
In an effort to develop mutual understanding among all peoples
and to maintain international peace and security, the member States
should ratify the agreed-upon principles set forth above, with minor
changes as are necessary to reflect the absence of the provisions which
remain controversial, in a treaty form to provide at least a general set
of controlling principles for DBS regulation.
193. II MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 105 (N. Jasentuliyana & R. Lee eds. 1979). Again it
must be stressed that, since the principles entitled State Responsibility, Duty and Right to
Consult, and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes are related to the three controversial principles
(Prior Consent, Program Content Regulation and Illegal/Inadmissible Broadcasts), the mem-
ber States would have to evaluate the extent to which they would be willing to include these
principles in the absence of the three controversial principles and make adjustments as desired.
[Vol. 9:377
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In their present form, the principles upon which the delegations
were able to agree have no binding legal effect. However, as a treaty,
these principles would provide a good set of general regulations suffi-
cient to regulate DBS as it is already being used today. Furthermore,
such an agreement would demonstrate mutual cooperation and good
faith among the member States, thereby creating a conducive environ-
ment for working out the remaining controversial issues.
The Outer Space Treaty is itself full of general principles con-
cerning the exploitation and use of outer space. 19 4 Yet, it was obvious
to the ratifying States that the Treaty could not provide principles
sufficient to regulate all space activities. This proved to be true, as
evidenced by the four subsequent treaties which followed as they be-
came necessary. 195 Similarly, a basic agreement for the regulation of
international direct television broadcasting would provide a solid
foundation upon which an edifice might later be erected by adding
subsequent DBS agreements as necessary. This would certainly be
preferable to waiting until an international incident causes a crisis
before an agreement has been reached.
Some commentators have suggested that the United Nations
should reappraise the Canada/Sweden approach to DBS regula-
tion. 196 This approach proposed actual establishment and operation
of DBS systems and stressed actual participation and cooperation by
groups of countries operating the system. 197 ITU's 1985 WARC has
already resulted in a world agreement for the technical regulation of
domestic direct television broadcasting, and has thus set the stage for
future multilateral agreements on a sub-regional basis.198 Were a
treaty containing the general legal principles mentioned above to be
adopted, the remaining controversial issues of prior consent, program
content and illegality of broadcasts could be resolved on a bilateral or
multilateral level between nations as needed. Such a scenario would
permit countries with differing political and philosophical ideologies
to co-exist in the same international community and treat each other's
values with deference.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 89 & 98.
195. See supra note 87.
196. N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 298.
197. Id. Bilateral or multilateral agreements could be easily arrived at between countries
with similar cultures. Jackhu & Singal, supra note 4, at 402. "Recognition of each partner's
equality of contribution also helps in such agreements." Id. For example, the Arab countries
are a group sharing a similar culture who have successfully created an international communi-
cations organization called ARABSAT. Id.
198. See supra note 183.
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Concerning broadcast spill-over, countries have had to deal with
the ideological differences of their neighbors for millenia. Today, it is
imperative that ideological differences be resolved in a peaceful fash-
ion. DBS countries bordered by neighbors who do not desire to re-
ceive broadcasts must, therefore, accord their neighbors a due degree
of deference when broadcasting. Such an accord might be reached by
bilateral or multilateral agreements, or by technological means.
ITU regulations mandate that countries must use every possible
technological means available to limit the "footprint" of their DBS to
their own territories.199 Technology is increasing rapidly in the area
of spot beam limitation; however, there will always be a certain degree
of unavoidable spillover.200 There remains yet another obvious and
efficient technological limitation which may be used to prevent broad-
cast spill-over: signal scrambling.
The technology now exists for DBS operators to scramble the
broadcasts from the satellite. 20 1 Such scrambling would require only
the addition of a signal decoder unit to the already requisite antenna
and converter for direct television reception. 20 2 These decoders will
ultimately become cost-efficient as they come into wider use. In the
United States, stations have already begun scrambling their satellite
signals so that even a television equipped with a parabolic dish an-
tenna and converter is incapable of receiving the scrambled signal in
the absence of a decoder.
20 3
The distribution of the reception equipment and decoder could
be controlled by countries using DBS.2°4 Neighboring countries
would be unable to receive the coded signal unless they purposefully
availed themselves of the signal by building decoders for them-
selves.205 While this device would not prevent unauthorized reception
of the signal by countries who seek the advantages of their neighbor's
DBS system, a decoder would resolve the unintentional spill-over
problem.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 116-20.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
201. N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 296-97.
202. Henry, T V Mushrooms in the Backyard: Satellite Dishes Are Pulling in a Galaxy of
Viewers, TIME, Sept. 16, 1985, at 56.
203. Id.
204. N. Jasentuliyana, supra note 97, at 296-97.
205. K. QUEENEY, supra note 15, at 225.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, direct broadcasting satellites offer developing coun-
tries the valuable tool of mass media. Mass media enables many
countries, developed and undeveloped alike, to solve their domestic
social and political problems. One means for solving social problems,
such as malnutrition, low-yield food production, overpopulation and
illiteracy, is to educate the population. DBS enables the user country
to educate previously unreachable populations. Additionally, DBS
can provide developing countries with a cost-efficient system of na-
tionwide telecommunications. Given the attractiveness of the tech-
nology, many countries are evaluating and implementing DBS
systems for domestic purposes. Unfortunately, efforts to come to an
agreement concerning international legal regulations of DBS have not
met with success. Because of the increasing use of DBS, the need for
the establishment of regulatory principles has only become more
urgent.
To meet the immediate need for regulation, member States of the
United Nations should ratify a treaty consisting of the principles upon
which they have been able to agree. Such an agreement would pro-
vide a strong foundation for the future resolution of controversial is-
sues and would also provide a regulatory framework to control the
increasing use of DBS systems in domestic applications which affect
the international community. Perhaps the remaining controversial is-
sues could best be resolved by bilateral or multilateral agreements
arising from joint DBS projects between countries.
ITU and UNESCO have been instrumental in assisting countries
to evaluate their educational and DBS needs. They should continue
in their efforts, and developing nations should seek their assistance so
that they may take advantage of the new technology.
In any event, it is clear that the absence of regulatory principles
will not result in any hesitation on the part of developing countries to
apply the technology to their needs, particularly to use DBS for edu-
cation to solve severe internal social problems such as language strati-
fication, malnutrition and unrestrained population growth. This
increased use of DBS is beneficial in two respects. First, it enables
developing countries to develop at a quicker pace. Second, the urgent
need to come to agreement encourages members of the international
community to work together in an atmosphere of intelligence and co-
operation to develop peace-keeping regulatory legal principles for an
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important and increasingly valuable new technology, direct broad-
casting satellites.
Michael I Stockman
